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ABSTRACT
Although studies on policy transfer have expanded, a general and
comprehensive understanding of policy transfer is lacking. This
study offers an evidence-based explanation of policy transfer
processes. We extracted constraining and facilitating factors from
180 empirical studies using PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic reviews and Meta-Analysis) and aggregated these
factors into a conceptual framework. We synthesize our findings
in four “transfer routes”. We conclude that actors could shape a
subset of those factors by taking certain decisions regarding
transferability, adoptability and process design, albeit within the
boundaries of the environment.
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“The Netherlands has its water management adequately organised. […]This approach is
valuable to share with other countries and inspire the development of their climate adap-
tation strategies.” stated Wim Kuijken, the Delta Commissioner (a special government
commissioner) in the International Water Ambition (Ministerie I&M 2016). With this
ambition, the Dutch government articulates its ambition to transfer the successful
Dutch water governance policy to other countries. Such occasions of policy transfer are
believed to be increasingly occurring nowadays due to the popularity of evidence-based
policy-making (Marsden and Stead 2011; Legrand 2012) and the widespread use of
modern information and communication means (e.g. the Internet) that allows access to
information about policies elsewhere (Dolowitz 2006). However, a comprehensive expla-
nation of how this process of policy transfer works is still lacking.
Existing research is limited to one or a few cases or uses deductive approaches to inves-
tigate limited elements of the transfer process. Most studies focus on single case descrip-
tions (e.g. Dolowitz and Medearis 2009). This focus on individual cases limits the
generalizability of findings. Furthermore, studies are usually deductive in nature:
authors develop a theoretical framework and test this framework in a case study or
apply an existing analytical framework to a different environment (e.g. Dixon 2007).
Such research is valuable, but cannot provide general explanations of the process of
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policy transfer. Aggregating individual cases and explanations might provide such
answers. Yet, several reviews have been conducted on policy transfer in the past decade,
but none of them systematically documented the factors that influence the policy transfer
process and thereby the outcomes of this process. We will elaborate on this in the next
section.
We aim to contribute to the understanding of the process of policy transfer, by con-
ducting a systematic review in order to develop a more evidence-based framework of
policy transfer. We will identify and aggregate evidence-based factors (i.e. that were
empirically identified) that have an influence on policy transfer processes. By focussing
on empirical research rather than new conceptualizations, we will be able to answer the
question why some mobilized policies are adopted and successfully implemented while
others are not. Our contribution can serve as a reference point for scholars studying
policy transfer processes and aid practitioners in enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness
of policy transfer processes.
The remainder of this article consists of four sections. In “Conceptual demarcation of
policy transfer” section, we will conceptually explore policy transfer, before introducing
the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA)
method that we used to review the literature systematically in “Method” section. We
present all identified factors in “Results: overview of presented factors and towards a con-
ceptual framework” section by introducing a conceptual framework on policy transfer and
discussing each factor’s contribution to transfer. The main added value of this review lies
in the subsequent deduction of policy transfer routes. In the “Discussion” section, we
present four common routes that policy transfer processes can take from initiation to
outcome. Finally, we conclude that factors early in the process may predetermine later
transfer outcomes.
Conceptual demarcation of policy transfer
Over the past decades, the body of literature on policy convergence has expanded and the
number of terms describing policy spreading has increased concurrently. In this section,
we will explore the most important concepts and position our study.
Several terms exist to denote processes of policy spreading, such as policy transfer,
policy diffusion and policy mobility (Stone 2001; Prince 2012) and policy adaptation
and policy translation (Mukhtarov 2014). These terms have overlapping meaning but
nuances can be found in their understanding of convergence (Marsh and Sharman
2009). In this article, we are interested in the “action-oriented intentional activity”
(Evans and Davies 1999) of spreading a policy and the use of “knowledge about policies,
administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place” to develop pol-
icies in another time or place (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 344). Furthermore, we consider
policy transfer to take place between autonomous actors that can make sovereign
decisions. To clarify this definition, we will compare two examples of policy transfer in
the European Union (EU). According to our definition, policy transfer encompasses
voluntary or pressured adoption of non-obligatory European norms. In contrast, our
study disregards adoption of mandatory EU legislation by EUmember states. This distinc-
tion is quite relevant, given that various bodies of literature have addressed the coercive
imposition of standards on other, mainly developing countries. Examples include
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literature on institutional transformation and studies on conditionality, including the
structural adjustments policy of the World Bank (Stone 2016). Although we acknowledge
the existence and potential relevance of these studies, we will limit this review to studies
originating from the policy transfer, diffusion and mobility literature. We elaborate on the
choice for these fields in “Method” section. Summarizing, we position this study within the
policy transfer tradition, but will incorporate studies using related terms that match our
perception of action-oriented, intentional policy transfer.
The body of literature on policy transfer has been reviewed several times before,
although these reviews did not provide satisfying explanations on how the process of
policy transfer is affected by internal and external influences. Some early reviews
focused on understanding the concept of policy transfer (e.g. Bennett 1991; Dolowitz
and Marsh 1996). In 2000, this resulted in Dolowitz and Marsh’s famous framework of
seven questions about policy transfer, coming down to questioning who engages in
policy transfer for what reasons, defining what is being transferred from where to
where and describing the process of policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). This
latter topic concerns the different degrees of transfer, what restricts or facilitates the
process and how this process relates to “success” and “failure” of transfer. More recent
contributions aimed to describe the conceptual refinements (Benson and Jordan 2011),
innovations in the field (e.g. Peck and Theodore 2012; Stone 2012; Temenos and
McCann 2012) or re-assess influential contributions to the literature (Stone 2016).
Although these reviews provide a clear overview of the (conceptual) evolution in the scho-
larly field of policy transfer, they do not provide an overall explanation of policy transfer
processes and outcomes.
Authors have listed (types of) factors that constrain policy transfer (e.g. Evans 2009),
thereby addressing the question in Dolowitz and Marsh’s framework on factors facilitat-
ing or restricting transfer processes. However, a comprehensive, empirical overview of
these factors is lacking, which is surprising given the crucial role that these factors
play in explaining the success of policy transfer (Marsh and Sharman 2009). In sub-
sequent phases of the policy transfer process different factors play a role, as some
authors identified (e.g. Kerlin 2009; Gullberg and Bang 2015). Moreover, certain
factors become decisive during specific phases of a transfer process (Sugiyama 2016).
Stone (2016) noted that some of these causes of failure or success are recurrent, such
as the role of context in transferability, the role of actors to improve or complicate
the policy transfer process and the role of learning to establish the transfer of knowledge.
Consequently, we wish to provide a comprehensive overview of factors that affect the
process of policy transfer and, based on these factors, connect internal and external
influences on policy transfer processes.
Method
This article aims to provide an overview of empirical studies since 1996 (when Dolowitz
and Marsh’s seminal article was published) through a systematic literature review. This
article makes use of the PRISMA method, an abbreviation of Preferred Reporting Items
for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analysis (see Shamseer et al. 2015). In this section, we
will elaborate on our application of this method, for a detailed explanation of this
method please consult Shamseer et al. (2015).
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Search strategy
We used the search terms policy transfer, policy diffusion and policy mobility to systema-
tically review the literature. In the introduction, various alternatives to the term policy
transfer were introduced, being policy diffusion, policy mobility, policy translation,
policy convergence and policy adaptation. These terms are often used interchangeably
(Stone 2001). However, the definitions of these six terms carry important nuances that
increase or decrease the relevance of terms for our study. We compared definitions and
randomly sampled 20 items per search term to evaluate whether this search term contrib-
utes to our cause. Policy translation mainly co-occurs with policy transfer. The remaining
unique items address translation of research findings into policy or translation of policy
decisions at a higher administrative level to a lower, executing administrative level. The
search term policy adaptation returned essentially noise, as most items concerned policies
of climate change adaptation. Policy convergence is “the tendency of societies to grow more
alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes, and performances” (Kerr 1983, 3,
through Bennett 1991) and lacks the intentional and action-oriented nature of policy
transfer. In addition, policy convergence focusses on results, rather than the processes
that are central in policy transfer. As a result, we excluded policy translation, policy con-
vergence and policy adaptation as search terms.
We applied four search strategies. First, we performed an electronic search in two
online databases: Scopus and Web of Knowledge. We limited the searches to peer-
reviewed articles only, to ensure a certain level of quality of included items. Only
English-language articles were included. Dolowitz and Marsh’s seminal article (1996)
unarguably has been influential (Benson and Jordan 2011) and is therefore taken as a start-
ing point for this review. Studies from 1996 up to and including 2016 are thus considered.
Second, we entered the search terms in the databases of eight journals with a non-Anglo-
phone geographic focus to compensate for a domination of items from the UK, USA and
Western Europe in the search results. The decision to include English-language articles
only potentially caused this domination. We selected the journals that focus on Latin
America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe and that occurred most frequently in the list
of journals returned by the database search. The latter criterion was introduced in
order to ensure the journal had published about policy transfer. Third, relevant books
and book chapters were identified using the electronic databases Web of Science and
Scopus. Finally, we asked experts in the fields of policy transfer, diffusion and mobility
to examine our references and asked them whether they missed any item. Three experts
suggested 56 novel items. Figure 1 summarizes the four search strategies and presents
the number of books and peer-reviewed articles that were identified with each strategy.
The relevance of identified items was assessed using a list of five eligibility criteria. The
first criterion is that only empirical findings are eligible for inclusion, given our goal to
develop an evidence-based account of factors that affect policy transfer. The second cri-
terion is that items should discuss agenda setting or policy formulation phases. Implemen-
tation or effect evaluation of transferred policies is out of scope. With similar reasoning,
we exclude implementation, spreading or enforcement at lower government levels (e.g.
local level) of policy issued by higher levels of government (e.g. federation or union).
The third criterion is that a study should identify factors as independent variables. This
review serves to identify factors that influence the policy transfer process, hence policy
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transfer is considered the dependent variable in this review. The review is thus limited to
articles that investigate independent variables (i.e. the factors that explain policy transfer).
The fourth criterion is that the transfer should be taking place or should have taken place,
excluding studies on transferability (i.e. export) and suitability (i.e. import) potential of
policy. Finally, the studied transfer should be the result of an intentional process. An unin-
tentional policy transfer includes the convergence of policies following changed global
policy paradigms.
Item assessment
The resulting items were assessed in a two-step approach. Firstly, we assessed titles and
abstracts and excluded items that did not meet the eligibility criteria. Items were always
included in case of doubt. Items that passed this first stage were subjected to a full-text
read. A total of 78 publications ultimately failed the criteria and was rejected in this
final stage after all. Figure 1 presents the flowchart of item selection.
Data analysis
All items were inductively coded and the final codes are the result of an iterative process of
coding and re-coding in Atlas.ti software. We used a coding process that combined
elements of selective and axial coding (Boeije 2010). An initial set of codes was pre-deter-
mined following Benson and Jordan (2011), identifying the policy (i.e. transfer object),
Figure 1. Flowchart from initial searches to items included in the PRISMA-based literature review.
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type of actors, the mechanism of transfer (voluntary, conditional or coercive) and the
outcome (non-adoption, imitation, adaptation or inspiration). We also collected data
about the study itself: the number of transfers studied, the methods used, the country
of the first author’s institute and of the origin and destination of the transferred policy.
We used an open coding approach to code factors, basing the initial codes on formulations
of the item’s authors. In other words: factors that are included in the framework are not
included because we found them relevant, but because they were identified by other
authors in their studies. A phrase like “A lack of financial factors obstructed the transfer
process.” would thus receive the code “constraining effect” alongside the original code
“Lack of financial resources”. We checked for similar codes and aggregated these
factors into one. The original code in our example was later aggregated into “Adoptability:
resources”. In subsequent iterative rounds, the original factor-codes were divided, aggre-
gated or renamed.
The results section is primarily based on the analysis of these codes. We present both a
quantitative description of the data analysis and an explanation of policy transfer success
of failure in the form of a conceptual framework.
Results: overview of presented factors and towards a conceptual
framework
After presenting general results in “Describing the research focus of included items”
section, we move to the presentation and integration of factors into a conceptual frame-
work in “Towards a conceptual model of policy transfer” section.
Describing the research focus of included items
A total of 180 articles is included in the review. See Appendix for the remaining references
which are not referred to in the text. These articles originate from 124 different journals.
Although journals from diverse fields of research are included, such as Urban Studies (4
times), most frequently cited journals relate to policy analysis. These other journals are
Policy Studies (8 times), The Policy Studies Journal (5), Journal of European Public
Policy (5), Governance (4), Public Administration and Development (4), Journal of Com-
munist Studies and Transition Politics (4) and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis:
Research and Practice (4).
Policy transfer research in Western countries dominates the included items with
Anglophone countries as its centre of gravity. A vast majority of the studies was conducted
by first authors affiliated in Anglophone countries, headed by the UK (26%,N = 180), USA
(21%), Canada (9%) and Australia (6%), and in Western-European countries such as the
Germany (6%) and Netherlands (5%). Moreover, the empirical studies included in the
review focus on transfer from, to and between these countries as well. The UK and
USA are studied most often, both as source and as destination of a transferred policy.
According to Benson and Jordan (2011), the field of policy transfer research diverged
from its initial focus on transfer between nation states. Although such a divergence is
observable on a conceptual level, only a small proportion of actual empirical studies
involves non-state actors. Out of 180, 173 items discuss at least one state actor, while
only 34 discuss one or multiple non-state actors (such as researchers, consultants or
POLICY STUDIES 227
NGOs). State actors are generally national governments or international governmental
organizations (IGOs, such as the OECD, EU orWorld Bank) in policy diffusion and trans-
fer studies. Policy mobility literature added studies on transfer between local governments.
The results further suggest that national governments are generally senders, receivers and
initiators of transfer processes. They are rarely facilitators or transfer agents, while IGOs
primarily act as senders and facilitators rather than receivers of policy.
The included items most often consist of in-depth analysis of policy transfer. Most
authors study a specific instance of policy transfer (80%, N = 180), although 20% of the
articles compare multiple different transfer activities. The vast majority of studies is
qualitative in nature, using interviews (57%), observations (15%) and document analy-
sis (9%) as most reported research instruments. However, roughly one in four articles
does not report on the methods used. Similarly, only 73% of the articles defines an
analytical structure using a theoretical framework, model or concepts. One-third of
the articles that specify their theoretical basis develops or tests a new theoretical frame-
work, while most built on existing concepts. Eleven studies do not even mention
neither their methods for data collection nor the theoretical underpinnings of their
analysis.
Summarizing, the included body of knowledge in our review will be most representative to
policy transfer between or originating from governments in Western cultures, although
factors resulting from the presence of other actors and geographic areas are covered as well.
Towards a conceptual model of policy transfer
The previous paragraphs described the results of the selective coding process. As described
in “Method” section, axial coding of factors was based on the original authors’ description
of a factor and on the constraining or facilitating effect of this factor. We aggregated
factors into four groups (see Table 1).
The aggregated factors form the building blocks for a simple conceptual framework, see
Figure 2. Environmental factors create the context that delimits the playing field for factors
of the other building blocks, namely Transferability of the policy itself and the sending
actor, Process Design of the interaction between sending and receiving actors and Adopt-
ability of the policy in the adopting context and eventually the adoption (or non-adoption)
of the transferred policy. The arrows indicate that outcomes of factors in these building
blocks influence factors in other building blocks. In the following section, we will
discuss the building blocks of this model and the associated factors in-depth.
Table 1. Factor groups and their occurrence.
Building block Total times mentioned
Items mentioning this factor
Number Percentagea
Environment 86 61 34%
Transferability 156 67 37%
Adoptability 170 102 57%
Process design 171 110 61%
Total 583
Note: The second column describes the identified total times factors in this building block. As a
single item can mention several factors in the same building block, we added the last column
showing the number of articles that mention at least one factor in a building block.
aN = 180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.
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Environmental factors
The first building block concerns environmental factors. As discussed in the introduction,
factors can be present in various phases of the transfer process. The environmental factors
play a role in all phases. We distinguish between the policy arena, the subsystem and the
general context. See Table 2.
Most environmental factors appeared in the policy arena. The policy directly shapes the
freedom of movement of the key actors. This includes the Zeitgeist, existence or absence of
competition with peers and the political climate (i.e. who forms the government). A policy
might be at the right place at the right time (e.g. Cook and Ward 2012) or make use of a
policy winding due to right timing (e.g. Busch 2005). A change of government can change
the policy arena in favourable ways and open up a transfer process (e.g. Delpeuch and
Vassileva 2016), but may suddenly terminate nearly completed transfers as well
(e.g. Dussauge-Laguna 2012).
The subsystem relates to the availability of alternative policies and the institutional and
political context. Policy transfer can provide an alternative to an actor. An example is how
the EU’s renewable energy policies provided an alternative to existing reliance on Russian
gas in Eastern European countries (Ademmer 2014). However, a transfer process may be
disturbed by the availability of alternative policies to the transferred policy (e.g. in the case
of competing health policies, see Clarke 2013) or flourish in the absence of competing pol-
icies (e.g. in the case of IWRM, see Allouche forthcoming).
The general context sets the boundary conditions for the policy transfer actors and is
formed by biophysical (e.g. Attard and Enoch 2011), cultural (e.g. Tsakatika 2012) and
socio-economic (e.g. Edwards and Beech 2016) conditions. For example, the British and
Australian Labour parties operated in similar neo-liberal systems but economic adversity







Figure 2. Simple conceptual framework of policy transfer.
Table 2. Occurrence of factors related to environment.
Factor Total times mentioned
Items mentioning this factor
Number Percentagea
Policy arena 44 42 23%
Subsystem 26 23 13%
General context 16 14 8%
Note: The table shows how many times the factor is mentioned in total and how many
different items mention the factor. The percentage reflects the latter.
aN = 180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.
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Overall, nearly one in four articles mentions factors in the policy arena, which suggests
that the policy arena might be the most important aspect of the environment to pay atten-
tion to in policy transfer processes.
Transferability
The second building block of the framework addresses the transferability of the policy. We
identified several factors in the review data that relate to the transferability of the transfer
object. Transferability-related factors dominate early stages of the transfer process, corre-
sponding to the exploration phase. See Table 3.
Transferability is first determined by the ability of the source actor to convey policies.
The source actor can have a positive image (e.g. Khirfan and Jaffer 2014) or a less positive
one (Bok 2014), resulting in respectively stimulating and discouraging adoption of policies
from this actor. Closely connected to a source actor’s reputation is its legitimacy to trans-
fer. Authors especially reported legitimacy issues faced by the EU when transferring to
neighbouring countries outside the Union (Radaelli 2000; Xheneti and Kitching 2011;
Vezirgiannidou 2015; Onursal-Beşgül 2016). Ademmer and Börzel (2013) provide yet
an alternative explanation, namely that high compliance costs of adopting EU policies
may outweigh benefits for non-EU countries such as Turkey.
Transfer processes are more easily established when there are existing relations between
source, adopting and third-party actors. Relations increase the acquaintance with policies
elsewhere through membership of an international organizations such as the EU or OECD
(e.g. Ayoub 2014; Oanc 2015) and policy networks (Sloam 2005), through colonial history
(Smith et al. 2002) or through trade and cooperation relations (Randma-Liiv and Kruu-
senberg 2012; Jinnah and Lindsay 2016).
The tolerance of the adopting actor further determines transferability. This ability is
determined by the receptivity and decision-making power of this actor. Receptivity
denotes the openness of the receiving actor to consider policies from elsewhere. A lack
of openness limits the potential for transfer from the start (e.g. Dolowitz and Medearis
2009; Keating and Cairney 2012). Openness is necessary but not sufficient, as actors
may lack decision-making power. Adopting actors can be dependent on other states or
donors (e.g. Ohemeng 2010). Such dependency reduces their sovereignty and can
benefit (coercive) policy transfer within or limit transfer to parties outside the spheres
Table 3. Percentage of studies that mention factors related to transferability.
Factor Total times mentioned
Items mentioning this factor
Number Percentagea
Conveying ability 22 21 12%
Actor relations 25 22 12%
Tolerance
Normative fit 10 10 6%
Decision-making power 17 13 7%
Normative fit 40 35 19%
Policy features
Characteristics 7 7 4%
Reputation 35 32 18%
Note: The table shows how many times the factor is mentioned in total and how many different
items mention the factor. The percentage reflects the latter.
aN = 180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.
230 E. (ELLEN) MINKMAN ET AL.
of influence (Ademmer 2014). Vezirgiannidou (2015) further demonstrated that actors are
less vulnerable to external pressures when they are able to make sovereign decisions.
Finally, policy features and normative fit determine transferability. Flexibility (Kerlin
2009; Lavenex 2014) and low context dependency (Jong and Bao 2007; De Loë et al.
2016) of policies increase the range of possible applications. Especially infrastructure pol-
icies may be tailored to specific biophysical conditions, reducing their transferability
(Michaels and de Loë 2010; Attard and Enoch 2011). On the contrary, transferability
increases when the policy matches the values (e.g. Chapman and Greenaway 2006) and
political objectives of the receiving actor (e.g. Clavier 2010). Then again, policies with a
reputation of proven effectiveness and success are popular transfer objects for policy-
makers because such policies are justified by their (perceived) success (e.g. Ovodenko
and Keohane 2012; Metz and Fischer 2016).
Summarizing, normative fit and policy reputation appear more often as a factor in
studies on policy transfer compared to, for example, the characteristics of the policy itself.
Process design
The third building block concerns the interaction between transfer actors, shaped by a par-
ticular process design. Process design concerns the set-up of interaction between actors
exchanging knowledge and in adopting and implementing the transferred policy (Table 4).
Relations to various actors in the form of building coalitions and engaging all key actors
are essential in the process design. Policy consensus enhances the ultimate success of a
transferred policy, whether this support is built around a broad coalition of domestic sta-
keholders (e.g. Müller and Slominski 2016) or external support (e.g. De Loë et al. 2016).
An adopted policy can fail in the final implementation phase as well, because support from
executive officials was not secured earlier phases (Šimić Banović 2015). Key players, such
as policy entrepreneurs and political leadership, can control this transfer process. This lea-
dership can follow from existing leaders’ characteristics, such as charisma (e.g. Ohemeng
2010), or can be managed through strategic human resource management. An example of
such strategic management is the employment of experienced West-German policy offi-
cials in East-Germany after the latter adopted West-German institutions after reunifica-
tion in the nineties (Welsh 2010).
In the previous section, we introduced the need of openness to external policies by the
adopting actor. While exchanging knowledge, actors engaged in the process need to be
Table 4. Occurrence of factors related to transfer process design.
Factor Total times mentioned
Items mentioning this factor
Number Percentagea
Actors
Key actors 39 37 9%
Coalition building 30 28 16%
Mutual understanding & adaptation 28 25 14%
Management of the network 34 31 17%
Transfer type
Exchange mechanism 23 20 16%
Level of coercion 17 16 9%
Note: The table shows how many times the factor is mentioned in total and how many different items
mention the factor. The percentage reflects the latter.
aN = 180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.
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open to mutual understanding of and adaptation to values, practices and beliefs of the
other actors. Transfer agents should look for both similarities and differences (Hoyt
2006, 238). Insufficient adaptation of policies to the local context may result in inappropri-
ate policy transfer. Jong and Bao (2007) argue that mutual understanding of cultural
differences is in fact more important than having a similar culture. This understanding
can be achieved by two-way instead of one-way communication as Chung, Park, and
Wilding (2016; Park, Wilding, and Chung 2014) demonstrated. Language is an important
factor in (preventing) miscommunication (Welsh 2010; Xheneti and Kitching 2011;
Fawcett and Marsh 2013). The role of language is disputed though, as Stadelmann and
Castro found no positive influence of having the same language on climate policy diffusion
in a large-N study (2014).
The management of the transfer network is important (Dolowitz and Medearis 2009;
Timms 2011). The absence of a clear hierarchy may constrain the transfer (Vinke-De
Kruijf, Augustijn, and Bressers 2012). On the other hand, a flat organizational structure
with high autonomy for transfer agents (Khirfan and Jaffer 2014) can be beneficial as it
may stimulate innovation (Khirfan and Jaffer 2014). Nonetheless, several studies stress
the importance of having a dense policy network. Characteristics of such density include
informal relations (e.g. Chien and Ho 2011) and face-to-face interaction (Vinke-De
Kruijf, Augustijn, and Bressers 2012). The existence of a dense network ensures that
resources can be mobilized (Rodgers 2014). When reserving too little time for the exchange
process, the resulting transfer may be superficial only (Pojani and Stead 2015).
Regardless of how formal the exchange process is organized, the process evolves in a
certain transfer type. Following existing typologies (Rose 1991; Goldfinch and Roberts
2013), we distinguish between imitation, adaptation and inspiration as adoption mechan-
isms. Imitation – also referred to as copying, mimicking or harmonization – is considered
a “quick fix” for policy-makers in urgent need of a solution and is associated with several
forms of failed transfer (Toens and Landwehr 2009; Crot 2010). Adaptation refers to the
incorporation of the basic model with changes and includes emulation along with the
more recent terms of translation and assemblage. Bulmer and Padgett (2005) suggest
that bargaining results in transfer that is the synthesis of several policies and relies less
strongly on one source. Inspiration results in the creation of new policies that are based
on (elements of) policies from elsewhere, such as the “hybrid system created that drew
on US and Australian examples for inspiration and copied selected aspects of policies
and statutes” (Michaels and de Loë 2010, 501). Learning is often associated with successful
transfers (e.g. Biesenbender and Tosun 2014). Additionally, we include negative lessons in
the category of “other” adoption models. Negative lessons as outcome refer to the decision
to seek alternatives because of the limited success of the originally considered policy.
Finally, the level of coercion has an influence on the policy transfer process. External
pressures can enhance the acceptance of certain policy norms by other countries, for
example, when these norms are part of a trade agreement (Jinnah and Lindsay 2016),
but may initiate transfers that are inappropriate for the objectives of the adopter
(Parnini 2009) or transfers that are not completed (Webber 2015). Conditional transfers
are formally voluntary but in practice the result of external pressure. An example concerns
the conditional loans from the World Bank (Larmour 2002). We will discuss the relation
between the level of coercion, the exchange mechanism and the adoption or non-adoption
of the transferred policy in the subsection “Policy (non-)adoption”.
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Outlining the process design, it seems that actor relations received the most attention in
the body of literature studied, in terms of both networks, key individuals and coalitions
formed.
Adoptability
The final building block is adoptability of the transferred policy and Table 5 presents its
factors. These factors mainly occurred during later phases of the policy-making process.
Suitability of the transferred policy plays a key role in policy adoption. In the first build-
ing block, we introduced the normative fit of a policy as part of its transferability. Besides
this normative fit, the institutional fit plays an important role as well. A transfer object is
adopted in a certain institutional context. If certain pre-requisites are met, a smooth policy
integration may be possible. For example, transfer of educational norms and reforms from
the EU to Turkey was possible due to the America-based model of higher education in
Turkey (Onursal-Beşgül 2016). When actors fail to meet these pre-requisites, implemen-
tation failure is inevitable, as was the case in transfer to India of industry reforms due to
the unforeseen lack of a regulatory agency in India (Xu 2005). The flexibility of a policy
can reduce the mismatch to a certain degree. Policies with a fixed core but high flexibility
in implementation will be adopted easier at destinations with a reduced normative or insti-
tutional fit (Kerlin 2009). Moreover, simple or simplified policies will require less organ-
izational capacity and are therefore less prone to failure in this phase (Lepinard 2016).
This adopting capacity consists of the expertise to search and implement external pol-
icies and the organizational capacity to evaluate policies. Extensive policy evaluation will
ensure that policy learning takes place and that only policy with a good fit is transferred
(Fawcett and Marsh 2013). Such evaluation also enables negative lesson drawing (Timms
2011). An important requirement is that destination actors are sufficiently equipped to
organize the process of searching and implementing external policies (Randma-Liiv and
Kruusenberg 2012). Such organization “requires significant commitment by politicians
and, especially, public servants to investigating its operation (… )” (Fawcett and Marsh
2013, 184).
Sufficient resources are needed to adopt and integrate a transferred policy. Such
resources could be time and human or financial resources. These resources are required
in all phases. However, a lack of resources is often mentioned to cause failure in the adop-
tion phase, especially lack of time and financial resources (e.g. Marsden et al. 2012).
Table 5. Occurrence of factors related to adoptability.
Factor Total times mentioned
Items mentioning this factor
Number Percentagea
Suitability
Institutional fit 47 37 21%
Flexibility of policy 11 11 6%
Capacity
Policy evaluation 18 17 9%
Expertise 27 26 14%
Resources 29 28 16%
Ability to change policy course 38 34 9%
Note: The table shows how many times the factor is mentioned in total and how many different items
mention the factor. The percentage reflects the latter.
aN = 180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.
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Even with sufficient organizational capacity and favourable policy characteristics, the
adopting actor should be able to change the policy course. Previously made policy decisions
create path dependency. Path dependency can be beneficial to the transfer (e.g. Gullberg
and Bang 2015) or abort the transfer at any time due to inability to change the policy
course (e.g. Zhang 2012). In the final phases of the transfer, a lack of support from decision
makers might be catastrophic. The transfer process itself may not have been hampered by
this lack, but restricts the outcome of policy transfer. An example is the fruitful exchange
of ideas between Dutch and Japanese train operators where the Japanese decision-makers
had decided on a different policy before the transfer was even completed (van de Velde
2013). Involving or ensuring access to decision-makers early in the process facilitates
the process (Kerlin 2009).
The most cited factors to influence policy transfer in this building block concern the
compatibility of the transferred policy, both with respect to integrating this policy in insti-
tutional structures and to its ability to intercalate with existing policy paths.
Policy non-adoption
The final element of our model concerns the outcome of the policy transfer process in
terms of adoption or non-adoption. We distinguish between successful adoption,
formal adoption and non-adoption of the transferred policy. Successful adoption refers
to a completed transfer process where the receiving policy-maker adopted the policy. Ulti-
mately, successful transfers achieve political goals as well but that element is left outside
the scope of this study. Non-adoption includes all transfers that were considered but
never initiated or that were initiated but aborted along the way. Formal adoption finally
describes policy transfers where the policy was formally adopted but was not implemented
or enforced.
We counted how often adoption, formal adoption and non-adoption were specified in
the studies and plotted the outcomes against types (Table 6) and the level of coercion of
these transfers (Table 7). We based the distinctions between transfer types and between
levels of coercion on the process design factors with the same labels. As could be seen
in Table 7, most included articles described cases of successful policy transfer and the
majority of review items concerns more voluntary transfer. A similar trend can be
observed for the transfer type. Imitation and adaptation are most commonly studied,
Table 7. Outcomes of policy transfer cases by force of initiation.
Force of initiation Successful adoption Non-adoption Formal adoption Total times mentioned (=N )
Coercive 50% 25% 25% 25 (100%)
Voluntary 70% 22% 9% 98 (100%)
Conditional/other 64% 32% 21% 17 (100%)
Table 6. Outcomes of policy transfer cases by transfer type.
Transfer type Successful adoption Non-adoption Formal adoption Total times mentioned (=N )
Imitation 60% 28% 12% 46 (100%)
Adaptation 73% 15% 13% 47 (100%)
Inspiration 76% 18% 6% 19 (100%)
Other 64% 2% 7% 28 (100%)
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but imitation results more often in non-adoption when compared to adaptation and
inspiration.
There are two explanations for this majority of successful and voluntary transfers in the
studies. The first explanation is that such cases receive more attention, making them more
feasible as study object and therefore create overrepresentation of such cases in empirical
studies. A second explanation could be that voluntary transfers are more likely to result
in successful adoption. Our data support previous claims (e.g. Ogden, Walt, and Lush
2003) that coercive or conditional transfers are more likely to result in unsuccessful or
formal transfer than voluntary transfers. Webber (2015) even draws a direct relation
between the coercive nature of the transfer and the resulting incomplete transfer. An expla-
nation is that the receiving actor is merely interested in complying with the conditions for
other purposes, rather than adopting policy out of genuine interest. However, especially in
developing countries a lack of compliance might be the result of lacking infrastructure to
implement a certain policy, rather than lacking the willingness to do so (Bennett et al. 2015).
Discussion and conclusions
General remarks on the framework
To address the lack of an evidence-based explanation of policy transfer processes, we based
our review of empirical studies on policy transfer. These studies are dominated by Anglo-
phone transfers and were usually conducted using interviews and document analysis to
study one or multiple cases of policy transfer. These cases predominantly involved state
actors rather than non-state actors and we observed a concentration of voluntary transfer
that resulted in policy adoption. We identified four clusters of factors (transferability,
process design, adoptability, environmental factors) that influence this policy (non-)adop-
tion. In Figure 3, we present the full conceptual framework based on the results, with
more details regarding factors.
Two results stand out in particular. First, factors related to process design play a crucial
role in policy transfer processes and the ultimate success or failure of such a process.
Especially the selection of the right actors, both individuals and coalition-wise, plays a
key role. Second, previous studies attribute a considerable value to similarities or differ-
ences in context (e.g. Stone 2016). The review supports this claim, but also indicates
that the policy arena is more often a decisive enabler or barrier for policy transfer.
Related concepts such as normative and institutional fit are more important than the
general context and so is policy reputation. These results suggest that the emphasis on
context as explanation for policy transfer outcomes should be accompanied by actor selec-
tion, institutional and normative fit and the present-day political situation. More impor-
tantly, the involved actors can control these factors to a certain extent, in contrary to
(general) context. Some factors are an important barrier when they are absent and a
key facilitator when present, or vice versa. An example of such a factor is having sufficient
resources. Control over such factors is important for those involved in policy transfer, and
the insights of our model pave the way for purposeful management of policy transfer
processes.
We refrained from a phase-based model, but conclude that most factors in the trans-
ferability building block played key roles during earlier phases of the transfer, while
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factors related to adoptability became decisive during later phases. The temporal role of
factors was suggested before (e.g. Kerlin 2009; Gullberg and Bang 2015) and this review
systematically mapped them. This temporal element is interesting, because they may
direct transfer agents’ attention during, for example, agenda setting.
In summary, we can conclude that some factors are more important than other
factors and that actors can control the nature of these factors to a certain extent. Further-
more, conditions at the early phases of policy transfer may eventually affect the final
results in terms of transfer and adoption mechanisms. As policy transfer processes
require extensive resources, such as time, money and human resources, the framework
can also help identify challenges in policy transfer that can be used to enhance the effi-
ciency and effectiveness transferring policies, thus reducing the risk of inappropriate,
incomplete or uninformed transfers (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). Coming research
could further analyse the nature of the relation between and the relative importance
of factors.
Route varieties of policy transfer
Based on the insights from our conceptual framework, we will discuss four policy transfer
routes that policy transfer can take from initial conditions to final outcomes. The frame-
work provides a comprehensive overview of factors that other authors have found, but this
section reflects the deeper insights we gained by scrutinizing their studies. When we
combine the factors discussed in the framework with the policy transfer routes, we
cannot neglect that the initial conditions of a policy transfer process influence the out-
comes of that trajectory. These “route varieties” include opportunistic, branded, pressured
and learning policy transfer. In the next paragraphs, we describe these routes in detail.
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Figure 3. Detailed conceptual framework, based on factors identified in the systematic review.
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Opportunistic policy transfer is characterized by bounded searches, considering a single
external policy that mainly serves to justify policy measures “at home”. The adopting actor
is usually the initiator of the transfer attempt. Political urgency to act can trigger oppor-
tunistic transfer, of which the imminent threat of a financial crisis is an iconic example.
These “quick fixes” usually rely on imitation as exchange mechanism, as time is highly
constraint and a limiting factor (O’Hara 2008). Constraining factors are usually found
in the process design building block, as the exchange is characterized by unidirectional
flow of information accompanied by limited knowledge about key issues and poor
policy evaluation. Opportunistic transfers might result in inappropriate or uninformed
transfer. Adoptability seems to be a strength of opportunistic transfers, making use of
environmental factors, but poor process design limits its successes.
Branded policy transfer is initiated after policy marketing or relies on existing (bilateral)
relations between source and adopting actors. Such strategies enhance the occurrence of
transfer, but these strategies are not without risk. Actors’ reputations can be improved
by lists of excellence, for example by city ranking on various policy topics or policy pro-
motion. The source actor plays a dominant role and is likely to act as a transfer agent to
influence formal adoption. These transfers depend on imitation and limited adaptation.
Such framing can enhance the perceived normative fit and fuel diffusion, although such
marketed policies risk ending up as inappropriate transfer due to the limited evaluation
of the policy. Similarly, Wood (2015) warns that existing contacts can increase the trans-
ferability but not necessarily result in the most suitable policy. Transferability is artificially
propelled and challenges are mainly encountered in the adoptability building block.
Pressured policy transfer ranges from transfer through peer-pressure (Cohen-Vogel and
Ingle 2007) to transfers based on limited sovereignty or full dependency of adopting
Table 8. Overview of policy routes, which links transfer type, enabling and constraining factors and
anticipated outcome to transfer route.
Route Opportunistic Branded Pressured Learning



































Note: We also present an exemplary reference per route.
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actors. Conditional transfers often involve third-party actors, such as IGOs. Such transfers
benefit harmonization and are a means for more powerful actors to influence decision-
making elsewhere. These transfers risk inappropriate transfer and associations with
neo-colonialist influences. Several authors (e.g. Jinnah and Lindsay 2016) mention
limited financial resources as a major constrain, thus suggesting that financial support
might be more effective than imposing financial inducements to laggards. Transferability
is enforced in pressured transfer and major challenges are found in the adoptability block,
although elements of the process design play a distinct role as well.
Finally, a process ofmutual learningmay result in policy transfer. Any actor can initiate
learning transfers, but decision-making remains exclusive to the receiving actor. The
search for policies is usually bounded and extensive policy evaluation or piloting is part
of the process, resulting in well-considered decisions and broad support coalitions. Con-
sequently, this route requires considerable resources and is therefore not always attainable.
A full learning process results in adaptation, inspiration or mutual influencing and is less
vulnerable for incomplete or uninformed policy transfer. Learning can make pressured
transfers successful, although a “learning paradox” exists (Toens and Landwehr 2009;
Evans and Barakat 2012). Unsuitable knowledge may be internalized, resulting in inap-
propriate transfer. Nonetheless, learning is generally associated with improved transfer
because learning internalizes procedures of policy formation. The process design is the
strength of learning transfer and requires attention throughout the exchange.
Limitations and a future research agenda
Our framework is largely based on successful, voluntary transfers. This skewness may be
the result of the eligibility that excluded studies on implementation and enforcement of
adopted policies, which may describe unsuccessful cases. This study could be extended
by including articles that focus on these steps of the policy cycle to increase our under-
standing of the relations between factors and outcome by sharpening the framework
and routes that we introduced here.
The PRISMA method proved to be effective in identifying a wide range of factors
described in existing studies. The prescribed selection procedure leads to the inclusion
of articles that would have remained unnoticed with other (systematic) review methods.
However, we acknowledge that there are other bodies of literature “out there” that may
address the same phenomenon but use different labels, such as literature on transform-
ation of institutions. The inclusion of non-English literature could further add to this
review, as Anglophone studies now dominate our results.
During this review, we noticed that the term transfer mechanism can refer to different
phenomena: the model of reproduction (e.g. inspiration, Theobald and Kern 2011), the
voluntary or coercive nature of transfer (e.g. Keating and Cairney 2012), the mode of
exchange (e.g. policy learning, see Nicholson-Crotty and Carley 2015) and the channels
through which policies spread (e.g. Nazif-Muñoz 2015). As described in the introduction,
the same goes for the various terms for policy spreading. These terminological voids are
problematic, especially given the continuous assimilation of policy transfer studies in
other research fields (Benson and Jordan 2011). We distinguished between transfer
types and level of coercion to describe respectively the model of reproduction and the
degree of coercion in transfer and encourage future studies to use consistent terminology.
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Finally, actors engaged in transfer make decisions that result in distinct circumstances.
These circumstances eventually induce various factors that line up for a certain trajectory.
This study has indicated that several factors shape the circumstances of policy transfer and
thereby leads transfer process to line up for certain policy routes. Thinking in terms of
policy transfer routes highlights that there is a relation between the transfer type, mode
of exchange and the ultimate policy success. Future studies can build on our framework
and route varieties by further operationalization of factors and by establishing the
added value of this framework in various case studies. Alternatively, research may focus
on the ability to shift between policy transfer routes. The identified learning route
further confirms the preference for “policy translation” or “learning” (e.g. Stone 2001)
over imitation and adaptation. A question that remains is how scientists and policy-
makers in practice can use these insights to actively anticipate these circumstances in a
policy transfer process.
This study increases our understanding of how the process of policy transfer relates to
success or failure and what constraints or facilitates these processes. We conclude that
actors could shape some of the identified factors by taking certain decisions regarding
transferability, adoptability and process design, albeit within the boundaries of the
environment. Professionals may use these insights in managing transfer processes and
form a conceptual departing point to study how these processes can be steered more
consciously.
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